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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Marjory Ann Barnes appeals from the judgments of conviction entered 
after a jury found her guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture, 
manufacture of a controlled substance where a child is present, possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine. Barnes claims, for the first time on 
appeal, that (1) she suffered a double jeopardy violation as a result of her 
convictions for both trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture and 
possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and (2) there was a 
fatal variance between the charging document and the jury instructions in relation 
to the conspiracy charge. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Following a report of concerns that Barnes and Gregory Klundt may be 
manufacturing methamphetamine, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search 
their residence. (R., Vol. I, pp.12-13, 20-25.) The search conducted pursuant to 
the warrant revealed a number of items associated with the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. (R., Vol. I, pp.16-18; see generally Trial Tr., pp.69-79, 94-
119.) 
The state charged Barnes with trafficking in methamphetamine by 
manufacture, manufacture of a controlled substance where a child is present, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture 
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methamphetamine, and conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine. 1 (R., Vol. I, 
pp.27-30, 45-48.) The state also filed a motion to join Barnes' case with Klundt's 
case, which the court granted.2 (R., Vol. I, pp.51-52, 60.) 
After trial, the jury found Barnes guilty of all four counts alleged. (R., Vol. 
II, pp.344-345.) The court imposed concurrent fixed five-year sentences for 
trafficking, possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetarnine, and a consecutive indeterminate two-
year sentence for manufacture of a controlled substance where a child is 
present. (R., Vol. 11, pp.372-373.) Barnes filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., 
Vol. II, pp.379-381.) 
1 During trial, the state filed an Amended Information, eliminating one of the overt 
acts alleged in the original Information and modifying the date and point of 
purchase in relation to another overt act. (Compare R., Vol. I, p.47 with R., Vol. 
II, p.237 (overt act alleged in ,r 2 of original Information eliminated in Amended 
Information); compare R., Vol. I, p.48, ,r 9 with R., Vol. II, p.237, ,r 8 (changing 
purchase date from March 14, 2009, to March 19, 2009, and point of purchase 
from Well Life to Walgreens.) 
2 Although Barnes' and Klundt's cases were joined for trial, they are not 
consolidated on appeal. Klundt's appeal, which raises the same issues Barnes 
raises in this appeal, is designated as Docket No. 38008 and is currently 
pending. (See Appellant's Brief, p.1 n.1.) 
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ISSUES 
Barnes states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Ms. Barnes twice placed in jeopardy for the same 
offense when she was convicted and was sentenced for both 
the greater offense of trafficking in a controlled substance by 
manufacture, and the lesser-included offense of possession 
of a controlled substance, to wit pseudoephedrine, with the 
intent to traffic? 
2. Did the district court create a fatal variance from the State's 
Indictment when it failed to limit the elements instruction for 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetarnine to those overt acts 
as alleged in the Information? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Barnes failed to demonstrate fundamental error based on her claim 
that she was twice placed in Jeopardy as a result of her convictions and 
sentences for trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing and 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture? 
2. Has Barnes failed to show a variance between the Amended Information 
and the jury instructions, much less a fatal variance resulting in 
fundamental error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Barnes Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Based On Her Double 
Jeopardy Claim 
A. Introduction 
Barnes contends, for the first time on appeal, that her right to be free from 
double jeopardy was violated "when she was convicted and punished for the 
greater offense of felony trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture, as well 
as the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance, to wit 
pseudoephedrine, with the intent to manufacture." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
Barnes' claim fails because she cannot establish the error she alleges was 
fundamental. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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C. Barnes Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Relation To Her Double 
Jeopardy Claim 
There are three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy 
clause: protection against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) 
multiple punishments for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 
(1980) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes 
omitted)); State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 256 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "In 
contrast to the double jeopardy protection against multiple trials, the final 
component of double jeopardy - protection against cumulative punishments - is 
designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the 
limits established by the legislature." Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984). 
Thus, the question under the double jeopardy clause whether punishments are 
"multiple" is essentially one of legislative intent. ~; see also Missouri v. Hunter, 
459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) ("With respect to cumulative sentences in a single trial, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court 
from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."). 
Barnes concedes her double jeopardy claim is not preserved for appeal, 
but argues she is nevertheless entitled to relief because the error is fundamental. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) Barnes is incorrect. 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Perry, unobjected to 
claims of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
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information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 978. Application of these standards to Barnes' 
claim of error demonstrates she has failed to meet her burden of establishing she 
is entitled to relief. 
The first prong of Perry requires Barnes to demonstrate a constitutional 
violation. Barnes argues she has satisfied this step in the analysis because, she 
asserts, "under the 'pleading' theory, possession of a controlled substance with 
the intent to manufacture, as charged by the State, is a lesser included offense to 
trafficking in metharnphetamine by manufacture." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Thus, 
Barnes asserts, she was "punished twice for the same criminal act" and "her 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture 
should be vacated." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) The flaw in Barnes' argument is 
that it relies on the false premise that Idaho has adopted "the broader 'pleading 
theory"' for determining what constitutes a lesser included offense versus the 
statutory theory. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) The Idaho Court of Appeals recently 
explained in Corbus, 151 Idaho at _, 256 P.3d at 779, that this is not 
necessarily the case; a conclusion subsequently supported by the Idaho 
Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Flegel, 2011 WL 3890343 (Idaho Sept. 6, 
2011 ). 
In Corbus, the Court stated: "Our review of Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent demonstrates that the Court has not been entirely consistent in its 
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application of either the 8/ockburgerf.3] [statutory] test or the pleading theory in 
double jeopardy cases." 151 Idaho at _, 256 P.3d at 782. The Court of 
Appeals noted that a review of Idaho Supreme Court precedent could lead to the 
conclusion that "when a defendant brings a double jeopardy claim under both the 
Idaho and United States Constitution, ... the pleading theory [applies] to 
determine whether there has been a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
under the Idaho Constitution and the 8/ockburger test [applies] to determine 
whether there has been a violation under the United States Constitution." !_g_,_ 
The Court, however, found this "conclusion is called into question" based on 
other Idaho Supreme Court precedent where the Supreme Court "seem[ed] to 
apply an elements theory more akin to 8/ockburger . . . in Idaho constitutional 
claims." !_g_,_ In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Flegel, the 
Court of Appeals was correct to call this conclusion into question. In Flegel, the 
Court applied both the statutory and pleading theories to determine whether 
sexual abuse is a lesser included offense of lewd conduct, expressing no 
preference for one test versus the other, and providing no indication that one test 
applies to state constitutional claims while the other applies to federal 
constitutionai ciaims. 204 ·j 'vVL 3890343. 
At a minimum, the Blockburger test applies to Barnes' claim that her right 
to be free from double jeopardy under the United States Constitution was 
violated. Corbus, 151 Idaho at , 256 P.3d at 779. "The appropriate inquiry 
under Blockburger is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the 
3 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
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other does not. The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Congress 
ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different 
statutes." Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
Although Barnes asserts a violation of her double jeopardy rights under 
both the United States and Idaho Constitution (Appellant's Brief, p.5), on appeal, 
she only argues application of the pleading theory (see generally Appellant's 
Brief, pp.7-10). Because the pleading theory does not apply to an analysis under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, Corbus, supra, 
Barnes has waived this aspect of her claim on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered."). 
Even if the Court considers Barnes' claim under the United States 
Constitution, she cannot establish a double jeopardy violation under the 
Blockburger test. To be guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine, the state must 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant (1) manufactured or 
attempted to manufacture methamphetamine; and (2) knew it was 
methamphetamine. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(3); ICJI 406C. On the other hand, to be 
guilty of possession of a controlled substance, in this case, pseudoephedrine, 
with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, the state must prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that a defendant (1) possessed any amount of 
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pseudoephedrine; (2) knew or believed it was pseudoephedrine; and (3) intended 
to manufacture the pseudoephedrine. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A); ICJI 403A. 
A review of the elements of both the trafficking statute and the possession 
with intent statute reveal that "each provision requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not." Ball, 470 U.S. at 861. Specifically, the trafficking statute 
requires actual manufacturing or an attempt to do so whereas the possession 
with intent offense only requires an intent to manufacture, with no actual 
manufacturing or attempt to manufacture required. Further, the possession with 
intent statute requires proof that the defendant actually possessed 
pseudoephedrine, while the trafficking statute includes no such element. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals succinctly explained the distinction between 
manufacturing a controlled substance and possession of the controlled 
substance with intent to deliver for purposes of double jeopardy in State v. 
Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 13, 794 P.2d 278, 283 (1990): 
The facts establishing the statutory elements of 
manufacturing a controlled substance are different from the facts 
required to prove the elements of possessing a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver. Manufacturing is completed when 
a person produces or otherwise prepares the controlled substance. 
I.C. § 37-2701(m) (Supp. 1986). On the other hand, possession 
with intent to deiiver does not require any production, possessing or 
synthesizing of a drug. The crime is complete upon actual or 
constructive possession coupled with the intent to transfer, or 
attempt to transfer, the substance to another person. I.C. § 37-
2701 (f) (Supp. 1986.) Each crime requires proof of an element not 
required by the other. Accordingly, we hold the separate 
convictions in this case do not violate the state and federal 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 
The same rationale articulated in Ledbetter applies to Barnes' assertion 
that possession with intent to manufacture is a lesser included of manufacturing 
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under the pleading theory. Ledbetter, like Barnes, also argued "both offenses 
relate to the same course of conduct." 118 Idaho at 12, 794 P .2d at 283; 
compare Appellant's Brief, p.9 ("It is readily apparent that both charged offenses 
are based upon the same factual predicate."). The Court of Appeals in Ledbetter 
"agree[d] the two offense are closely related," but noted it is a "constitutionally 
permissible legislative choice" to separately punish "each step leading to the 
consummation of a transaction which it has the power to prohibit." 118 Idaho at 
13, 794 P .2d at 283 (quotations and citations omitted). Although the Court did 
not separately analyze the statutory and pleading theories, it ultimately rejected 
Ledbetter's argument that the close relationship between the offenses invoked 
double jeopardy. l!;L. 
Because Barnes cannot establish that possession with intent to 
manufacture is a lesser included offense of trafficking by manufacture under the 
statutory Blockburger theory or the pleading theory, she cannot establish a 
constitutional violation resulting from her conviction for both offenses. As such, 
Barnes' claim of error fails under the first prong of Perry. 
Barnes' fundamental error double jeopardy claim also fails under the 
second prong of Perry. Under Ledbetter, supra, there would have been no basis 
for an objection to convictions for both trafficking by manufacturing and 
possession with intent to manufacture. In addition, as explained in Corbus, since 
Idaho case law is not clear on what theory should be applied to a double 
jeopardy claim, and where there is no violation under at least one theory, the 
error cannot plainly exist. 151 Idaho at_, 256 P.3d at 780-783. 
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Because Barnes cannot satisfy either the first or second prong of the 
Perry analysis in relation to her double jeopardy claim, she has failed to establish 
any fundamental error resulting from her convictions for both trafficking in 
methamphetamine by manufacturing and possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to manufacture. 
11. 
Barnes Has Failed To Show Any Variance Much Less A Fatal Variance That 
Would Support A Claim Of Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Barnes argues, for the first time on appeal, that the "district court created 
an impermissible variance when it failed to limit the element [sic] instruction for 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine to those overt acts alleged in the 
Information." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Barnes has failed to show any error, let 
alone fundamental error, entitling her to relief on this claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the 
evidence and jury instructions at trial is a question of law given free review on 
appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 
1998). Likewise, whether such a variance is fatal to the conviction is also given 
free review. Id. 
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C. Barnes Has Failed To Show A Fatal Variance Between The Amended 
Information And The Jury Instructions, Let Alone A Fatal Variance That 
Constitutes Fundamental Error 
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts 
different from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 
100, 105 (1979). A variance may also occur where the jury instructions allow the 
jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more alternative 
theories other than what is alleged in the charging document. State v. Windsor, 
110 Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182 (1985); Statev. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160,166, 90 
P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004). Not all variances are fatal because "there is a 
marked distinction between a 'mere variance' and a variance which is 
automatically fatal because it amounts to an impermissible 'constructive 
amendment."' State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 
2003) (quoting State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 565-566, 861 P.2d 1225, 1230-
1231 (Ct. App. 1993)). A variance between the information used to charge a 
defendant and the instructions given at trial constitutes a due process violation if 
it deprives a defendant of fair notice of the charges against him or subjects him to 
a risk of double jeopardy. Montoya, 140 Idaho at 164-66, 90 P.3d at 914-16. A 
defendant is deprived of fair notice only if he was misled or embarrassed in the 
preparation or presentation of his defense. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 
182, 191 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2008). 
The state charged Barnes with conspiring with Klundt, "to commit the 
crime of trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture, in violation of I.C. § 37-
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2732B(a)(3)." (R., Vol. II, pp.236-237.) In support of this charge, the state 
alleged the following overt acts: 
1. On or about January 15, 2009, Marjory Barnes purchased 
pseudoephedrine in Rathdrum with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
2. On or about January 30, 2009, Gregory Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Shopko with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
3. On or about February 1, 2009, Marjory Barnes purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Walgreens with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
4. On or about February 21, 2009, Gregory Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Albertsons with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
5. On or about February 25, 2009, Marjory Barnes purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Walgreens with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
6. On or about March 4, 2009, Gregory Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Walgreens with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
7. On or about March 7, 2009, Gregory Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Albersons [sic] with the intent to 
manufacture methamphetamine. 
8. On or about March 19, 2009, Gregory Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Walgreens with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
9. On or about April 1, 2009, Gregory Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Walgreens with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
10. On or about April 15, 2009, Marjory Barnes purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Well Life with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
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11. On or about April 16, 2009, Gregory Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine from Shopko with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.237-238.) 
In relation to the conspiracy charge, the district court instructed the jury 
that Barnes was charged with "unlawfully, willfully and knowingly conspir[ing] 
and/or agree[ing] with Gregory Klundt to commit the crime of trafficking in 
methamphetamine by manufacture" and instructed the jury on all overt acts 
alleged in the Amended Information. (R., Vol. II, pp.286-287 (Instruction No. 6).) 
The court further instructed the jury that, in order to find Barnes guilty of 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, the state must prove, in relevant part: 
3. the defendant, MARJORY ANN BARNES, and Gregory Klundt 
agreed; 
4. to commit the crime of Trafficking in Methamphetamine by 
manufacturing; 
5. the defendant intended that the crime would be committed; 
6. one of the parties to the agreement performed at least one overt 
act; 
7. such act was done for the purpose of carrying out the 
agreement. 
(R., Vol. II, p.310 (Instruction No. 27).) 
Barnes claims, for the first time on appeal, "[t]he fundamental mistake with 
the district court's elements instruction is that it did not limit the State, in its 
attempt to prove a conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, to the overt acts as 
alleged in the State's charging document." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Barnes also 
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asserts the district court "[f]urther complicat[ed] the issue" by "fail[ing] to provide 
the jury with a definition as to what is considered to be an 'overt act' under Idaho 
law." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Barnes' arguments lack merit and fail to satisfy 
any part of the Perry standard. 
Barnes' argument fails under the first prong of Perry because she has 
failed to establish any variance, much less one that rises to the level of a due 
process violation. The jury instructions for conspiracy exactly reflect the charging 
document (compare R., Vol. 11, pp.236-238 with pp.286-287) and the jury was 
accurately instructed on the elements of conspiracy (compare R., Vol. II, p.310 
with ICJI 1101 ). While the conspiracy elements instruction itself does not list the 
overt acts, it specifically instructs the jury that it must find "one of the parties to 
the agreement performed at least one overt act." (R., Vol. II, p.310.) The other 
conspiracy instruction that includes the charge, in turn, lists the overt acts, which 
are specifically identified under the heading: "OVERT ACTS." (R., Vol. II, p.286 
(emphasis original).) That Barnes may have preferred the instructions be drafted 
differently, or believes that an instruction defining "overt act" may have been 
helpful, does not mean there was an actual variance in this case. Her claim to 
the contrary lacks merit and she has failed to demonstrate a constitutional 
violation based upon a comparison of the Amended Information to the jury 
instructions. 
Given the lack of any variance between the charging document and the 
jury instructions, Barnes' argument also fails under the second prong of Perry 
because there is no error, much less one that is "clear and obvious," such that 
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counsel should have objected to the instructions as given. Moreover, the record 
is inadequate to determine whether counsel's failure to object was tactical or 
based on some shortcoming capable of objective evaluation. 
Barnes' variance claim also fails under the third prong of Perry because 
she cannot show that the failure to list the overt acts in the elements instruction 
"affected the outcome of the trial proceedings" for at least two reasons. First, the 
conspiracy instructions (R., Vol. II, pp.286-287, 310), when read together, clearly 
inform the jury that it must find at least one of the overt acts specifically charged 
in the Amended Information and listed in Instruction No. 6. See State v. Reid, 
151 Idaho 80, _, 253 P.3d 754, 758 (Ct. App. 2011) ("When reviewing jury 
instructions, the appellate court must determine whether the instructions, as a 
whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law."). Second, 
there is no basis to conclude that the jury would have reached a different verdict 
had it been more specifically instructed that it could only consider the overt acts 
listed in Instruction No. 6 in order to find Barnes guilty of conspiracy instead of 
relying on other "acts" presented at trial that were not alleged in the Amended 
Information, such as Barnes or Klundt having one of Klundt's children buy 
pseudoephedrine. (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) This is particularly true given the 
substantial, competent evidence proving the specific overt acts alleged in the 
Amended Information. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.22 - p.276, L.3 (Barnes purchased 
pseudoephedrine on February 25, 2009 (R., Vol. II, p.237, 115)); p.276, Ls.13-17 
(Klundt purchased pseudoephedrine on March 4, 2009, March 19, 2009, and 
April 1, 2009 (R., Vol. II, p.237, 1111 6, 8; p.238, ,i 9)); p.283, Ls.11 (Barnes 
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purchased pseudoephedrine on January 15, 2009, and February 1, 2009 (R., 
Vol. II, p.237, ,m 1, 3)); p.290, Ls.3-7 (Klundt purchased pseudoephedrine on 
February 21, 2009 (R., Vol. II, p.237, ,r 4)); p.291, Ls.15-19 (Klundt purchased 
pseudoephedrine on March 7, 2009 (R., Vol. 11, p.237, ,r 7)); p.296, Ls.3-8 
(Klundt purchased pseudoephedrine on January 30, 2009, and April 16, 2009 
(R., Vol. 11, p.237, ,r 2, p.238, ,r 11)); p.303, Ls.9-15 (Barnes purchased 
pseudoephedrine on April 15, 2009 (R., Vol. II, p.238, ,r 10)). 
Because Barnes failed to show any variance, much less a fatal variance 
resulting in a constitutional violation that could support a claim of fundamental 
error, he has failed to demonstrate any basis for reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Barnes' convictions. 
DATED this 6th day of September, 2011, 
rlr~ 
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